



SECRETDate 23 October 1943To: Ensign Rutwell

It seems to me that securing the information suggested in the attached memorandum would be entirely within the scope of our intelligence activities. The fact that the intelligence we accumulate may have a post-war planning use does not seem to bar our collecting it.

W.H. Goney

SECRET

Office of the Secretaries

not to file
(9139) see only 54 letter can't be interpreted

SECRET

X Bunché Dr. P. I.
X State Dept
X Colonial Status
29 October 1943

Dr. Wm. L. Langer

Ensign E. J. Putzell, Jr.

Materials on Planning for Post-War Colonial Status
(Dr. Bunché)

General Donovan has considered the file on the subject matter and decided that it should not be pursued until an over-all program in the field of post-war planning has been worked out for OSS.

It is his request, however, that effort be made to interest the State Department in the subject of Dr. Bunché's memorandum of September 21, 1943, to Mr. Kent.

E.J.P., Jr.

cc: Colonel Burton
Colonel Forgan
Major Deering

bc: Gen. Donovan's files

R.J. Putzell-Birchard

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan

DATE: 20 October 1943

FROM: Secretariat

SUBJECT: Materials of Planning for Post-War Colonial Status

Major Doering has the following comment:

"Unless we get into postwar planning with some systematic predetermined program and purpose, we may get into trouble with sporadic efforts such as this."

E.J.P.
Edwin J. Putzell, Jr.
Ensign, USNR
Acting Chief, Secretariat

SECRET

(C) F.M.A. - 12-7-5
 X Post War Plan
 X Bunch
SECRET
 X Colonial Status

10/11

MEMORANDUM FOR: General William J. Donovan
 FROM: G. Edward Buxton
 SUBJECT: Materials of Planning for Post-War Colonial Status

I believe that General Magruder is correct in stating that travels and interviews by Dr. Bunch concerned with post-war Colonial matters cannot be justified by the Directive from the JCS.

I accept, however, Dr. Langer's statement that Dr. Bunch is especially well qualified for such a survey. I believe, however, that it would be wise to consult the Secretariat of the JCS before undertaking such an errand and it might well be necessary to similarly consult the State Department.

G. EDWARD BUXTON

GEB:FS

SECRET

1/1 d Brighton -

Will you
tell me
what you

think
of

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Col. G. Edward Buxton

FROM: John Magruder, Brig. Gen.

SUBJECT: Materials on Planning for Post-War Colonial Status

DATE: 6 October 1943

I have conferred with the Planning Group respecting the project of Dr. Bunche for travelling in England for the purpose of contacting officials concerned with post-war colonial matters. I cannot see where this type of activity on the part of R & A personnel can logically be justified by any mission assigned to us by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


The Pasvolsky Committee in the State Department is specifically assigned studies of this nature. The State Department has numerous qualified representatives all over Africa. It is considered questionable that no serious study is being made of this problem by authorized officials. In any event, OSS cannot undertake to make up the deficiencies of other government bureaus if such deficiencies do exist.

I, therefore, recommend that Dr. Bunche's trip to England for purposes stated by him should not be authorized.

John Magruder
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.

Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

Enclosure



Gen Magruder
Recommendation

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel G. Edward Buxton
FROM: William L. Langer
SUBJECT:

DATE: 28 September 1943

X Post War Plans
X Bunche, R. J.
X State Dept
X Colonial Status

I am sending you herewith a memorandum prepared by Ralph J. Bunche, the Chief of our African Section. This very cogent memorandum exposes what seems to me to be a very sad state of affairs. From all indications, the coming of peace negotiations will find us completely unprepared on matters relating to Africa while our Allies have put a good deal of time and effort on this complex of problems.

If you agree, I should like to suggest that Dr. Bunche be sent to London to open up this situation. I am sure that it would be General Donovan's view that if no one else is attending these matters, OSS at least should keep abreast of the times. In this connection I think I ought to say that although Dr. Bunche is a Negro, he has extensive connections both in this country and abroad and enjoys the esteem of everyone with whom he works. He has lived in England, France, and Holland and has done extensive field work in Africa. He is personally known to colonial functionaries, both high and low, not only among the British but among the French, Dutch, Portuguese, Belgians, and Spanish. As you doubtless remember, he attended the Mont Tremblant and Lake Couchiching conferences in Canada and dealt with high British officials like Lord Hailey, Sir John Pratt, and many others. There is no question whatever in my mind that Dr. Bunche is one of the very few outstanding experts in this field in the United States and that he would be a worthy and effective representative of the OSS wherever he was sent on business.

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Director, Branch of
Research and Analysis

cc Gen. Magruder

SECRET

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Sherman Kent

DATE: Sept. 21, 1943

FROM: Ralph J. Bunche

SUBJECT: Materials on Planning for Post-War Colonial Status.

1. American Post-War Interest in Africa: It is reasonable to assume that American interest in colonial areas, and especially Africa, will be projected into the post-war period. It has been amply demonstrated that the political and economic disposition of such areas has an intimate connection with the maintenance of world peace and economic stability. The war has projected us into these areas in a very great and responsible way. We are now, and no doubt will continue to be, urgently concerned with the political and economic affairs of Africa. Through our many agencies, military and civilian, we have engaged in arrangements which will have a very salient effect on the political and economic future of the territories of Africa. It seems scarcely tenable that having got ourselves so involved in Africa, in both civilian and military operations, we will pull out when the shooting stops with no continuing sense of responsibility for the future of the continent. It is certain that in any case our commercial operations in the continent

SECRET

Sherman Kent

- 2 -

Sept. 21, 1943

will be expanded.

2. Materials for Post-War Planning: It appears that amazingly little is being done in American governmental agencies at this stage with respect to our post-war relations with Africa.

The one governmental unit in which there is apparently fixed responsibility for this sort of effort is the Division of Political and Economic Studies (Pasvolsky) in the State Department. From personal contact I gather that not very much on Africa is now being undertaken in that unit. Two or three months ago I was called to the Political Studies sub-division for an interview designed to sound me out on the possibility of transferring to that agency for the purpose of working on a "colonial charter" in the post-war world. At that time (and I believe now), only Benjamin Gerig was working on Africa, and though he is a reputable authority on the subject of the legal status and operation of the mandates, he has little knowledge of the actual problems and conditions of Africa.

At the IPR international conference in December at Mont Tremblant, the large American delegation, including important State Department representatives, made a rather pitiful showing with respect to factual data on the colonial problems of the Pacific. In contrast, the British, Dutch and even the Fighting

SECRET

Sept. 21, 1943

Sherman Kent

- 3 -

French representatives, were admirably prepared.

The sheer fact is that our country is far behind the others in the assemblage and correlation of colonial data with respect to post-war settlements. There are no organizations in this country undertaking the sort of work done by such private and semi-governmental agencies as Chatham House, the Nuffield Research Group, the Fabian Bureau, the Colonial Advisory Committee and the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society in Britain. These groups have been working feverishly for the past several years and have amassed a great wealth of material bearing upon the post-war problems of Africa and other colonial territories. In sum, at this late stage in the game the United States is ill-prepared to cross swords with Britain and the colonial nations of Europe on colonial problems and planning.

3. Proposals: It would be possible for one who knows his way around in Britain and who is familiar with the African scene, to obtain, within a couple of months or so, a vast amount of information from British agencies on their planning with respect to Africa and other colonial areas. I know definitely, through conversation and correspondence with such strategic figures in the colonial field as Lord Hailey, Lord Lugard, Creech-Jones, M.P., Capt. Gamsons, M.P., Malcolm MacDonald, Sir John Pratt, Sir George Sanson, Marjorie Perham, and a host of others, that

Sherman Kent

- 4 -

SECRET
Sept. 21, 1943

access to the important studies being made in Britain can be obtained if the right approach is made.

If the person to be sent is carefully selected (a vital basis of selection should be his knowledge of the scene and his acquaintance with the personalities in the field), it would scarcely be necessary to invoke any elaborate cover. It would be possible, if cover is thought necessary, to send the representative over under the auspices of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, which is the only American private agency which has had a long-established interest in Africa and which is highly respected in British colonial circles. The recent report of the Phelps-Stokes Fund on "Africa and the Atlantic Charter from an American Standpoint" received an excellent press in Britain and throughout the Empire.

The present disposition of the British Government, as recently enunciated by Col. Stanley, Minister of State for the Colonies, is to recognize an international responsibility for the future of colonial areas and peoples. The present would seem the logical time to undertake a project of the nature herein suggested. The information obtained would be of value to both the military and civilian branches of our Government.

Sherman Kent

- 5 -

SECRET
SEP. 21, 1943

4. American Impact: Incidentally, it seems a pity that no American agency is making any organized effort to determine just what political, economic and social impact American troops and civilian authorities have made upon the peoples of Africa in those sections in which American personnel has been present in substantial numbers. There can be no question that in many such areas the results of American penetration, both constructive and disruptive, will be long enduring. A traveling observer charged with direct responsibility for the collection of this sort of data could harvest a very unique crop.

Office South 12 409
x Land Lease
x Report
x Gage, Charles S

21 August, 1943

Mr. H.R. Stettinius, Jr.
Administrator, Office of
Lend-Lease Administration
Five-Fifteen 22d Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Stettinius:

I was pleased to receive the Gage reports on South Africa. They are an interesting and valuable addition to our material on that country. Your thoughtfulness in sending them to us will, I know, be particularly appreciated by those of our staff who are concerned with South African affairs.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Office of Lend-Lease Administration
 FIVE-FIFTEEN 22d STREET NW.
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
 Administrator

August 27, 1943

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
 Director
 Office of Strategic Services
 Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan,

Mr. Charles S. Gage, the Head of our Lend-Lease Mission to South Africa, has recently returned, and at my request has prepared several reports which I thought may be of interest to you. I am enclosing them herewith.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
 E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Enclosures - 2

Answered & of 1 Sept. 1943



Alfred Vert 11.31.43
Glassford Mission
SECRET
X D/F

15 August 1943

Colonel Cecil Gridley
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Public Health Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Gridley:

In accordance with your request to Colonel Burton, I am enclosing herewith the following papers:

1. Letter from Admiral Glassford to General Donovan, dated 20 July 1943.
2. Cable from Admiral Glassford to General Donovan, dated 8 August 1943. #10
3. Cable from General Donovan to Admiral Glassford, dated 10 August 1943.
4. Cable from Admiral Glassford to General Donovan, dated 13 August 1943.

Very truly yours,

O. C. Doering, Jr.
Major, AUS
Chief, Secretariat

Encs. (4)

11 August 1943

SECRET

Vice Admiral William Glasford
 Head of the American Mission
 Dakar, French West Africa

My dear Admiral Glasford:

Your cable in regard to the D/F station at Dakar reached me just after my return from overseas, during which trip I had extended discussions with our various Commanders in the field, and with parallel services of the British, both in the North African Theatre and in London.

It is because of these recent discussions and the broad scale interlocking plans which involve the D/F services as a whole, that your cable is one of very grave concern to me. I want, therefore, to explain clearly to you the fundamental factors which are involved.

Let me say first that I appreciate the motives behind the action which you have taken and the circumstances that led you to make this decision; namely, that our relations with the French remain on a sound basis, and that every care be exercised not to jeopardize the foundation that you have built.

On the other hand, the decision both in regard to the D/F station at Dakar and the assignments of Gurnea and Pittman, as mentioned in your letter of July 20, inevitably place in the hands of a foreign nation a monopoly in

Vice Admiral William Claiborne - 2.

secret intelligence, to the detriment of our own interests in the area involved and with potential danger of a far-reaching nature to operational plans in more widely extended areas.

I am sure you will agree that to depend on the French or any other foreign intelligence system would at this very vital time place our government, as well as our various Theatre Commands, in a position whereby they would be unable to prosecute their operations successfully. The rapid and unpredictable shifts in international policies, and the inter-relationship of these factors, one upon the other, make it essential that the United States be at all times as fully informed as possible. This can only be done dependably by the establishment of and by reliance upon a completely independent intelligence system of our own. This would of necessity include the centralized control of policies, manpower and actual physical facilities.

Only on the results of such independent, unprejudiced, timely, and absolutely trustworthy intelligence can military, political, and economic decisions be made. Experience has demonstrated that such intelligence cannot be maintained unless secured by our own men under our own system, uncontrolled by and independent of foreign agencies.

There is, however, another element of very real significance in the decisions which you have reached, about which I want you to be fully informed. The R/T station at Bitter

Vice Admiral William Blaxford - 1.

is only one of an international network of E/F services covering vast areas and coordinated to function with the utmost accuracy. This service not only dovetails with other stations of our own establishment, but inter-relates with similar services of our other Allies. To make this possible and to achieve the greatest results in the quickest time, agreements with parallel services of the other E/F systems were necessary.

The information obtained through these systems is delivered only to the Theatre Commander in Algiers. At the discretion of the Theatre Command and according to the understandings which have been reached, it is then made available to our Allies on a parallel basis of exchange of their information with us.

It was to achieve this type of information that our organization has been working since October, 1941. It undertook this difficult and long neglected task under direction of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these operations receiving the approval of the Secretaries of the War and Navy.

I fully appreciate "the delicate nature of the political situation at home", but that very fact in itself makes our work there the more indispensable. Even though Patterson and Quenson may be generally known as intelligence officers, they are able to protect adequately the security of operations in which they will engage. If for any reason you cannot avail yourself of these services in this way, we must see our

Vice Admiral William Standford - 4.

national interest place those specially trained men elsewhere to maintain our system.

We all agree with you that much can be gained from the help and cooperation of the French. However, we must adhere to the principle that as a matter of security only the results of secret intelligence, and not the operation methods, may be exchanged with foreign nations. This policy is followed by GNS, by the British, and by the other Allies with whom we have coordinated this work.

I am fully sensitive to the gesture of good will toward an Allied power underlying the decisions you have made, but I urge you to make a most careful review of these in the light of the factors which I have discussed in this letter. Certain intelligence gained through the D/F installation at Dakar covers areas which are not under the authority of the French and which would not concern the French administration in your area. I am convinced that the advantages gained by putting into effect such decisions will be far outweighed by the losses to our intelligence system, and therefore our cause as a whole.

I hope this presentation of the matter will serve to make clear the situation, and that you will reconsider your action.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Date: 8/3/43

SECRET

To: Mr. Whitney Shepardson

Re: Letter dated July 20th from
Vice Admiral William Glassford

Will you please let me have your
comments on the attached?

G. Edward Buxton

*I agree with my word
but Gen'l Buxton has
written.*

ME

G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

12-1131

Col. Duxton:

8 August 1943

A complete waste of effort and good material which should be rectified by the discreet removal of the officers. It is typical of the absence of understanding of the functions of SI.



Jm.

John H. Duxton, Brig. Gen.
Deputy, Intelligence Service

21. Magruder
Date: 7/29/43

To: General John Magruder *AMS*

Re: letter from Vice Admiral Wm.
Glassford, dated July 20, 1943.

Will you please return this to
General Donovan's files after
you have read it?

Florence Smith

1964 JUL 26 11:15 9/1

To: Colonel Bolton

1. I imagine you will want to forward this to General Magruder for his information after it has served your purposes.

2. Mr. Bolton of SI who is interested in the matter is receiving a copy of the Australia communication.

I am quite sure that General Magruder will be interested in the letter received.



Office of the Director

(5139)

THE AMERICAN MISSION, DAKAR, F.W.A.

20 July 1943

SECRET

My dear General:

Having been here for approximately a month, I have been able to get a clearer picture of the needs of the American Mission and of my own office, particularly with respect to intelligence, and accordingly have made certain adjustments for the time being in the duties performed by Major J. T. Patterson, U.S.M.C., and Captain E. P. Quereau, U.S.A., of your office, of which I feel you should be apprised.

It has seemed appropriate to me to differentiate between strategic intelligence and operational intelligence. If the American Mission were a naval command, I should define the latter as combat intelligence. On the recommendation of the Mission which I headed here last winter, the War and Navy Departments respectively had stationed Military and Naval Observers at Dakar and I have assigned the duties of strategic intelligence to these officers--based on their familiarity with conditions here and the general nature of the intelligence desired by the War and Navy Departments.

I have assigned operational intelligence duties to Major Patterson and Captain Quereau and I feel sure that their O.S.S. training will have made the assignment particularly appropriate.

Also for the time being, because of the delicate nature of the political situation here and the specific objectives of the American Mission, it has seemed desirable that none of my intelligence staff operate "under cover" or use under-cover agents, and I have instructed Major Patterson and Captain Quereau accordingly.

Because Major Patterson and Captain Quereau are in uniform and are generally known to be intelligence officers, it would be very difficult for them, in my opinion, to maintain the secrecy of any under-cover operations which they might attempt, particularly because of the highly efficient A.O.F. Surets here. But perhaps a more important reason is that we are able to have at our command the services of the Surets itself to perform any required under-cover investigations for us. Such cooperation between the Mission and the Surets not only will maintain our present good relations with the Government, but should secure for us the optimum results.

SECRET

To set up our own investigating organization would have the unfortunate result of causing the French authorities to feel that we lacked confidence in their own organization at a time when our relations with the new Government here should not be disturbed.

Because both of the directives that I have given Major Patterson and Captain Quereau may be somewhat at variance with their original written directives on which you and I were in accord, I felt that you should be advised of the changes which, because of local conditions, I have found it necessary to make.

Both officers have approached their work with much zeal and I feel sure will be of much assistance to me in the work of the American Mission.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

William Glassford
WILLIAM GLASSFORD,
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Head of Mission.

Brigadier General William Donovan, U.S. Army,
Director, Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

Copy to: Mr. Rudyard Boulton,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

Admiral Glassford Mission
Bostonsen, Capt J. T.
Cusean, Capt E. P.

6 August 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR General Magruder

Would you look at the attached memorandum from Whitney Shepardson, and also give me comments on Admiral Glassford's letter to me.

I am afraid that what they have done is to turn everything over to the French.

WJD

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 8, 1945

MEMORANDUM TO DIRECTOR, O.S.S.
FROM AFRICA SECTION, S.I.

Admiral Glasford has requested that Captain Patterson, JUNIOR, be promoted to Major. It is Admiral Glasford's conviction that such an increase in rank would add to the usefulness of the Dakar Mission. I therefore recommend that a request be made to the Commandant of the Marine Corps that Captain Patterson be given a spot promotion to Major as soon as possible.

Attached is a letter hurriedly written and signed by Admiral Glasford in Mr. Miller's office this afternoon.

R. Boulton
 R. Boulton

Attachment

COPY

UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

June 8, 1943.

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

If it is appropriate for Captain Patterson to be promoted to Major, I believe it would add greatly to his usefulness, as well as facilitate the performance of his duties as a member of my staff.

Very truly yours,

/s/ William Glassford

VICE ADMIRAL, U. S. NAVY

*Original letter sent
to the Commander in Chief
U. S. Marine Corps*

WJG

COMMINT FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 2, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

General William J. Donovan, Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

Replying to your letter of
May 31, this will confirm that Captains
Patterson and Quereau are in all respects
acceptable to me for intelligence activi-
ties on my forthcoming mission to Dakar.

Please permit me to thank
you again for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

William Glassford
WILLIAM GLASSFORD
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy.

Handwritten:
X Glassford, William A.
X Patterson, James T. Cpt
X Quereau, Edmund P. Lt

May 31, 1963

**Vice Admiral William A. Glassford
Navy Department, Room 3065
Washington, D. C.**

Dear Admiral Glassford:

May I submit for your formal approval the persons whom you have already indicated that you would be willing to accept as the O.S.S. representatives to take charge of the intelligence activities on the Dakar mission. These gentlemen are

Captain James T. Patterson, USMC

Captain Edmund P. Quereau, AUS

I hope that your acceptance of these men will provide us with further opportunities to be of service to you and your mission.

Sincerely,

**William J. Donovan
Director**

Handwritten:
WJ
K. Boulton

Handwritten:
Director, SI

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

INTEROFFICE MEMO

To: General Donovan

FROM: Director, S.I.

DATE: May 20, 1943

FROM: R. Boulton

SUBJECT: Classford Mission

For the sake of the records, I think it would be desirable if we retraced our steps in regard to our negotiations with Admiral Classford and set down in writing the results of our conversations and conferences with him about the OSS representation on the mission to Dakar.

To this end, I suggest that General Donovan write a letter submitting for the Admiral's formal approval the names of the two men, Capt. Patterson and Capt. Quoran whom, as you know, the Admiral has already expressed informally his willingness to accept as the intelligence members of his staff.

After the Admiral's written approval has been received, I think it would be appropriate for General Donovan to provide Captains Patterson and Quoran with a memorandum or letter confirming their appointment to the posts on the Admiral's staff and giving them the authority for proceeding on their mission.

To General: for General Donovan


R. Boulton

Approved.

W. H. L. H. H.

May 20, 1943

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

x O-28.
x Organization

TO: Director, O.S.S.
FROM: Africa Section, S.I.
SUBJECT: O.S.S. at Dakar

May 11, 1943

BACKGROUND

On January 1, 1943 Africa Project 19 was approved by you for undercover operations in French West Africa. This Project is attached. It provided for a personnel of six men and the approved budget totaled \$47,600. During February French West Africa was formally included in the North African Theatre Command and as a result, authority for operations in this area can come only from General Eisenhower's staff. JCS-170 was subsequently approved which further complicated the picture as far as operations in Dakar are concerned. In the meantime, before the approval of JCS-170, the North African Theatre Command had given approval to the dispatch of an agent under the cover of Vice Consul at Dakar. The State Department which had resisted our attempts to get a man to Dakar all through the fall, finally gave approval for the appointment of a Vice Consul of our selection in February.

Influenced by the changing picture in North Africa, State Department reversed itself towards the end of February, and all efforts to clarify the situation which included a call by Mr. Sheperdson and myself on Mr. Berle have been unavailing. It is the State Department's contention that since Dakar is in a theatre of operations it is not necessary nor desirable for them to provide cover for our operations.

- 2 -

It should be pointed out that while Dakar is in the North African Theatre of Operations on paper, the North African Theatre, or at least the OSS organization in North Africa has absolutely no contact with Dakar, nor knowledge of the conditions that prevail there. On the other hand, the West African Theatre has maintained a continuity of awareness of the problems at Dakar since early in 1942. From the State Department cables which are disseminated to SI and from other sources, it is my personal belief that the North African Theatre has to date been interested in Dakar only as far as matters of supply, production, transportation, and economics are concerned. While General Eisenhower requested that the radio team be sent to Dakar to attempt to locate suspect enemy transmitters, there has been no organized program for the exploitation of the SI problems or psychological warfare problems that exist.

As a result of your approval of Africa #19 the covers were developed for six men involved, the men were recruited, and some of them have been fully trained. The entire operation, however, has been held in abeyance since with Mr. Shapiro's return from North Africa we were informed that inasmuch as French West Africa was in the North African Theatre, nothing could be done without the approval of the North African Theatre Command; that no one in the OSS organization in North Africa was competent to plan or informed on the problems of French West Africa; and that until someone reached North Africa who was so informed it was impossible to present for approval any intelligence analysis to so complicated a situation.

COVER ORGANIZATION

If it is your desire and that of Admiral Glassford, who I understand has been appointed Minister to French West Africa, to have an undercover organization, the following arrangements can be immediately established;

- 3 -

1. Under diplomatic cover either as Vice Consul or preferably as Special Assistant to the Minister - Mr. Edward P. Quereau. Age 33; unmarried; formerly employed by the Signal Corps with special qualifications in French diplomatic traffic over the past year and in secret communications; speaks French fluently; on personal grounds he is completely acceptable to the State Department. He has received the full course of S.I. training and since the first of April has been working in the Africa Section with particular reference to SI matters pertaining to French West Africa and the DF network. Mr. Quereau is classified as 4-F and has a draft board permit to leave the country. He is fully trained and qualified to operate a network of undercover agents.

2. Under cover of the Atlantic Refining Company - Mr. George Alfred Page. Age 35; married; formerly employed by the Comm. Mutual Life Insurance Co.; has had complete training in all SI schools and was engaged by the cover organization which has extensive interests in Dakar where they intend to station him. He has already procured his passport and visas and is now awaiting transportation. He speaks French fluently and has an excellent professional background for the position which he is to fill. He is at present classified 3-A and has already obtained a permit to leave the country.

3. Under cover of the War Shipping Administration - Mr. Jacob Last. Age 33; married; has been engaged in the legal department of the French Line; has a thorough background and knowledge of shipping such as would fit him for this position in which we intend to use him at Dakar. In addition, he has a good speaking knowledge of French and considerable experience in dealing with French marine circles. Although selected for this position he has not yet been engaged in view of the complications outlined in "Background". His draft status is 1-A, but he has been given a stay of induction for 30 days pending a final decision as to whether his role in this project can

be developed.

4. Under cover of B.E.4 at Dakar - Mr. Groszold van Dyke. 58 years of age; married; at present employed for Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., steel business; has had great experience in the executive end of the steel business as well as in selling, buying, and managing his products. He is excellently qualified to fill the position for which we intend him. In addition he speaks French fluently. Because of his age he presents no draft problem. He has not yet been engaged in view of the complications outlined in "Background".

5. Under cover of Rehabilitation and Relief Committee at Dakar - Mr. Hamilton S. Newsom. Age 45; married; employed at present by Newsom & Kerwin, food brokers. Has a thorough knowledge of all the aspects of the food business which qualifies him to operate under this cover. In addition, he has a thorough knowledge of French. He has not yet been engaged because of the complications outlined in "Background". His draft status is 3-A.

6. Under cover of Lend Lease - Mr. Alden Boyd. He is at present employed by Lend Lease. We have not yet approached this man, but he has been highly recommended by our West African Area Supervisor as being ideally suited for our work. He is, in addition, already in Dakar and arrangements, if desired, can be made for our Area Supervisor to contact him on the subject of working with us.

OPEN OSS ORGANIZATION

I do not imagine that an open, recognized OSS organization in Dakar is desired, especially if it is to be responsible to a State Department representative. However, if it is desired, all the above men could be fitted into a civil OSS organization. I do not know whether there are

- 5 -

commissioned ranks available for such an organization, but in any case I do not believe that a military organization would be as effective or as suited to the situation which exists at Dakar.



R. Boulton

Enclosures:

Project No. 19 (Copy 2 of 3)


~~State Dept. Vice Consul file~~

Files on six men mentioned in memo.

Incorporated in Queenan's file

MM

WEST AFRICAN ORGANIZATION




- ① = US, Van Gool, Dakar
 ② = M. L. L. G.
 ③ = M. L. L. G.
 ④ = L. L. G.
 ⑤ = B. B. W.
 ⑥ = R. B. W.
 ⑦ = P. A.
 ⑧ = F. L. L. G.
 ⑨ = F. L. L. G.
 ⑩ = P. A. A.

- ⑪ = T. L. G.
 ⑫ = B. L. L. G.
 ⑬ = I. H. L. G.
 ⑭ = M. L. G.
 ⑮ = M. L. G.
 ⑯ = S. L. L. G.
 ⑰ = M. L. L. G.
 ⑱ = F. L. L. G.
 ⑲ = F. L. L. G.
 ⑳ = US Command G.
 ㉑ = US Command G.

- = in the field
 ○ = agent selected & approved by mission
 ■ = Task force approved & assigned duty for proposed mission
 — = Trained and ready

PROJECTED OPERATIONS, DAKAR AREA.



Office Memorandum 16589
1. Lourenco Marques
Plans
Operational

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

May 13, 1943

TO: Director, O.S.S.
FROM: Africa Section
SUBJECT: Operational Plan - Lourenco Marques

For your information there is enclosed a copy of the most recent report on the Lourenco Marques Operational Plan contained in a pouch received May 12.

This is the first mention of a time schedule. No information has been received to date regarding the results of activity contemplated for April 30.

A. W. Schmidt

A. W. Schmidt

Enclosure

SECRETPlan of Action in Lourenco Marques

1. The details for drastic measures were finally worked out with Col. Smith last week. The program, to be executed under Nero's presidency, is as follows:

a) About April 30, ALFREDO MANNA, head of the Stefani Agency and Campini's lieutenant in espionage, will be taken over the border. This will be done for two reasons: to get into the hands of the British a man who will spill the beans to such an extent that it will be possible to demand Campini's recall; and to get up the wind of the Italians. The actual removal will be done without London's permission, although it is anticipated that London will be pleased with the results.

b) About May 15, it is planned to have enough of the crew of GERUSALEMME lined up to make it feasible to blow her up. Careful consideration decided against any attempt to take her away, because of her very awkward position way down the bay, and because at least two tugs--with the attendant difficulties of having them manoeuvre the ship unobserved--would be necessary. This, too, will be presented as a fait accompli.

c) About the end of May, the Italians will blow up the Stefani Agency, in the name of Free Italy, demonstrate before the Consulate, and generally raise as much hell as they can be induced to stir up. (This business of getting the Italians going will cost some money, since the Consulate is their sole means of support; hence my request for more--assuming that it is proper for me to bear a share).

d) About the middle of June, other things being equal, Dr. Wertz will be taken away--if possible, by Italian hands.

The point of all of this, apart from whatever useful information may come out of it, is to demoralize the Axis community entirely.

4/19/43

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: May, 1943

TO: General Donovan; Director, S.I.; Major Hutcheson
 FROM: Africa Section
 SUBJECT: British- American Relations in West Africa W-137

In accordance with the request of the British Empire Section regarding material critical of our allies, the following information is being sent only to you and to the two others whose names appear above:

On April 13th source was invited by Mr. Wilson of PERO to have dinner with Mr. J. A. Jones, formerly Governor of the Northern Provinces, Gold Coast, and now Economic Adviser to the Resident Minister. On this occasion Mr. Wilson opened the discussion with his favorite topic -- "Well, the Frogs are doing everything in their power to separate the British and Americans!" When asked whether he was referring to the Frogs in West Africa or the Frogs through-out the French Empire, he replied, "I said all the Frogs and I mean all the Frogs, because all the Frogs are the same." he then added: "everyone today is talking of preserving the French Empire, but no one seems to speak of preserving the British Empire."

The British asked many questions about the political set-up in the United States. They seemed to feel that the American people are much closer to the French than they are to the British.

SECRET

May, 1963

- 2 -

The main question that interested them was: "Will Roosevelt be re-elected in 1944?"

In the course of a bridge game, source won three shillings, sixpence and the British officials had no change. When source casually remarked that they could put it on Lend-Lease, Mr. Jones did not consider it a joke. Source was surprised at this, because in previous conversations with the British a casual remark about Lend-lease was definitely considered as an amusing by-play. Mr. Jones said that he did not believe that the Americans would be willing to give up their footholds, such as the Acera Airport, after the war. When source suggested that Mr. Stettinius had done a great job in explaining to Congress how Lend-Lease worked in reverse and that what we owe the British is incalculable, Mr. Jones said in a very bitter tone, "Yes, I know Mr. Stettinius; he's the brother of the head of Pan American and Pan American expects to spread all over the globe." When source corrected him by saying, "Mr. Trippe is the brother-in-law of Mr. Stettinius," he answered, "That makes little difference."

Source was disturbed not so much by the statements as by the tone in which they were made. Source has reason to believe that Mr. Jones is fairly close to Lord Swinton, but does not know whether he was reflecting the opinions of Lord Swinton. Source suggests that the statements may have been brought on by the expansion program of the Acera Airport.

R. Boulton
R. Boulton

Handwritten: Africa Section

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D. C.

Date: April 16, 1943

TRND MEMORANDUM

TO: The Director, SI
FROM: Africa Section
SUBJECT: Axis Disension in Portuguese East Africa

Herewith is a memorandum on the above subject for your approval or recommended changes.

It is recommended that the following dissemination be effected:

General Donovan, General Magruder, Planning Board

/s/ [Signature] / HH
Initials: Desk Chief

Date:

TO: Reporting Board
FROM: The Director, SI

I agree - no other dissemination.
(Approval or Remarks)

/s/ [Signature] / HH
Initials of Director

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Date: April 16, 1943

TREND MEMORANDUM

NOTE: The following memorandum does not purport to be a comprehensive study of the subject. It is based only on information currently received from highly confidential sources by one branch of OSS.

SUBJECT: AXIS DISSENSION IN PORTUGUESE EAST AFRICA

I. CONCLUSIONS FROM CURRENT INFORMATION

The digest of the cables below leads to the conclusion that serious rifts are developing, first within the ranks of the Germans and Italians themselves in Portuguese East Africa, and secondly, between the Germans and Italians in this colony. The April 12 cable may echo the Italian movement in Europe to withdraw from the war effort completely if they could discard German domination.

II. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION

On March 8, 1943, a paragraph in a cable from a representative in Lourenco Marques requested that propaganda material suitable for the dissentients among the Germans and Italians there be sent at the earliest possible moment, since good opportunities were developing in this direction. This request was passed on to P.W., and in conjunction with O.W.I. material has been prepared which will be sent to our representative from both Johannesburg and the U.S.

On March 31, 1943, a cable was received from the same representative stating that contact had been made with the enemy and that he now had a pipeline directly to Werts, the Nazi S.I. chief in Portuguese East Africa. His question to us was if we wished any false information pumped into the pipeline which might aid in confusing the enemy. This

SECRET

2

matter was discussed with C.I. and their suggestion was that he wait until the enemy indicated enough interest or curiosity to come back a second time, by which time we might have sufficient information by pouch to make some helpful suggestions.

On April 12, a further cable was received in which the representative reported that as a result of the pipeline he had learned that the German legation in Lisbon had instructed Wertz to maintain a much closer surveillance over Campini, the Italian Consul in Portuguese East Africa, in anticipation of Italian attempts to pull out of the war.

SECRET

To: _____
query by WJP to Bruce whether matter
had been discussed and agreed upon.

1/27 Memo fm Shepardsen that matter
had been discussed with Mr. Mephereson
of WGA. Matter is routine.
1/27 Memo returned to Bruce.
1/27 signed original returned to Bruce

Director's Office

(1300)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

Representative
SECRET

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

DATE: February 17, 1945

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT:

I asked Lt. Commander McBaine for his view on the question you raised as to the advisability of our having a man in Tripoli.

His comment is forwarded to you herewith.

If agreeable to you I will ask Lt. Commander McBaine to give us his considered opinion on arrival in Cairo, after our mission has been established as a result of the survey, and also (perhaps) after discussion with the Theatre Commander. In the meantime I suggest that you send a cable to Guenther somewhat as follows:

*Send
to
Guenther
by
cable*

"We are considering desirability of placing one or more representatives in Tripoli for liaison purposes. Hope you will bear that in mind in your negotiations and try insure leeway for us to do so if we decide it is best. What are your views?"

W.H.S.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D. C.

February 16, 1945.

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

TO: Mr. Shepardson

FROM: Lt. Commander McBaine

We should certainly send someone to Tripoli to survey the place.

Offhand, I believe that we ought to place an Italian Desk man there to report and recruit. I don't believe that Tripoli will be worth while as a base for operations across the Mediterranean since Algiers, Tunis, Malta and Derna are all better places.

Considering OSS operations alone, I think that Tripoli should be a part of the North African set-up.

But since, according to the newspapers, Gen. Wilson's Middle East Command extends up to the Tunisian frontier and includes Tripoli, it seems to me that we will have to include Tripoli in our Middle East set-up.

It should be given cipher communication with both Algiers and Cairo.

Signed - T.H. McB.

UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

James V. Land, 1943
X Representative
X Dakar
X Land, Phas, G. M.

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

February 3, 1943

SECRET

Colonel William J. Donovan
Director
Office of Strategic Services

Dear Colonel Donovan:

In reply to your letter of January 27 regarding the assignment of a representative in Dakar, French West Africa, I wish to advise that we will be very pleased to assist you in these arrangements as you have outlined. It is understood that these arrangements will be similar to those with respect to the representative in South Africa.

If you will give us further information concerning your desires, we will assist you in every way possible.

Very sincerely,

W. S. Land
 W. S. Land
 Chairman

*Copies to**Kimball**Shepardson**2/4*

STUBER
January 29, 1949

Mr. A. Kinnel

Armed Forces

Representation at Orlan

We refer to your memo of January 21 addressed to
Col. Hase. We have now received by cable through our field
representatives approval of the Theatre Command at Algiers and
the Theatre Command at Orlan, in the proposal for the appoint-
ment of a Vice Consul of our selection, to be attached to the
Consulate at Orlan.

Will you kindly convey this information to the
Department of State and request their further consideration of
the proposal.

G. B.

George B. Butler

MBH:SU

Copy Col. Hase

Copy Mr. Chapman

January 21, 1943

Rear Admiral Emory S. Land,
Chairman, Maritime Commission
Washington, D. C.

Dear Admiral Land:

The Office of Strategic Services is anxious to have representation in Dakar, French West Africa. Such representation, however, cannot be ostensibly in the name of the Office of Strategic Services. If the Maritime Commission would be willing to accept a person of this Office's selection as being attached to the Maritime Commission Office at that point, the purposes of this office would be admirably served. It is understood, of course, that all expenses incurred by such a mission would be underwritten by this office.

The Office of Strategic Services would be very grateful for any help which you may wish to extend in this matter.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

File A-1847 *Liberia 99*
Withheld
Personal
Africa, W
Boulton, R.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel W. J. Donovan

DATE: Feb. 17, 1948

FROM: R. Boulton

SUBJECT: Situation in Liberia

With further reference to the situation as it stands at present in Liberia, attached you will find two memoranda on the subject which are being sent to you for your information at the request of Mr. Shepardson.

You will no doubt recall that we proposed sending you our recommendations and a fuller interpretation of the situation as we see it.

We shall be pleased to hear any comments you may care to make.



R. Boulton
 Africa Section

Attachments

Report from Essex on Liberia
2 copies, 1 each to you, Boulton &
Shepardson - 1 each to J.G.
A-1847

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

TO: Major Bruce

January 11, 1948

FROM: Mr. Boulton

SUBJECT: Colonel Donovan's query of January 11 regarding Liberia.

1. We have today cabled Seena, our chief man in Liberia, that we are preparing to put his recommendations into effect, that is withdrawing his personnel or covering our connections with them, as soon as his patch report is received.

2. The radio equipment that was destined for the Liberian radio monitoring and geosomatic crew was at Colonel Donovan's direction diverted to North Africa about a week ago. Clearance from General Fitch's demand has been received through Trout, our supervisor on the West African Coast at Accra for the abandoning of the radio phase of the Liberian project in favor of North Africa. Upon receiving this clearance from the West African Command, the information was sent to Colonel and by cable that six civilians, top-notch operators, were available in Liberia if he wanted them and was to use them in civilian capacity.

3. Seena was informed today of the imminence of this move, both of equipment and personnel, and told to stand by prepared to act as soon as he received instructions from us.

4. If the six civilian operators cannot be used in North Africa because of their civilian status, Major Lowman informs me that they are trained in England.

5. A letter has been written to Colonel Snyder, Assistant Chief of Staff, and, thanking him for the transmission of a report on the Liberian radio project from Captain Oliveira, who was recruited by us and turned over to A.T.C. Intelligence as a cooperative arrangement for covering the Liberian radio group. In the letter to Colonel Snyder it was pointed out that Mr. Boulton would call on him and make sure that the abandonment of the radio phase of the Liberian project did not cause any embarrassment to his former command.

6. With regard to other personnel in Liberia, namely our doctor and our other necessary workers, the problem of canceling financial arrangements has been discussed with Colonel and action will be taken as soon as these detailed recommendations are available.

Memorandum to Major Bruce - 1.

January 11, 1943

7. Before any action is taken with respect to the Liberian radio team, Mr. Boulton will call on Mr. Cooper of Pan American Airways and explain that an urgent emergency has made the decision necessary, and will arrange with Mr. Cooper that no embarrassment to Pan American results from the diversion to another area of the men who are ostensibly employed by them.

8. Essex was requested to inform us of whom in Washington Colonel McCone and Colonel Kirchhoff have requested the abandonment of certain phases of the Liberian project so that OSS may be prepared, if necessary, to contact these persons rather than have the recommendation come from them to OSS that the personnel be curtailed.

9. Prior to Essex' departure he was asked to investigate the entire Liberian situation, and the recommendations which are now on the way are the result of his survey.

RB

RB:RBC

R. B.
Africa Section

Approved, W
SECRET
W. J. Donovan

January 3, 1943

Brigadier General John R. Deane,
Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff,
Public Health Building,
Washington, D.C.

My dear General Deane:

I am attaching copy of a memorandum by Perry M. Jester of the State Department who has recently been Consul General in Lagos, West Africa.

It appears that there is a letter from the State Department, addressed either to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or to the Secretary of War, asking approval of the proposal contained in the attached memorandum. The suggestion was made to me that I should talk to Secretary Hull about it, but this I have refused to do, and I am bringing it to your attention in the event that Secretary Hull signs the request.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

January 2, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel William J. Donovan
 FROM: G. Edward Buxton

We are asked by State Department representatives to write a letter to Secretary Hull recommending the appointment by the State Department of a Commissioner or special representative of the President to West Africa headquarters at Accra. It is proposed that such appointee's duties would put him on the consultative level with Lord Swinton and in addition the coordination of the activities of all American agencies, both executive and commercial in that area. Some of the agencies which it is proposed should be coordinated are REA, WFO, OSI, CVI, MID, ONI, American Air Lines, Oil Companies, Etc. Secretary Hull is preparing to ask the Army to approve such an appointment by the State Department.

COMMENTS

I can understand that the right man in this position could be valuable for long range planning, especially planning affecting the post war world. It seems probable that his principal interests would be economic and

Page 2

political. Two factors in the proposal make me hesitate to recommend a letter from you to Secretary Hull supporting the proposal until you and I have an opportunity to discuss them briefly.

1. Do we want any civil commissioner, even the President's representative, coordinating OSS; or do we want to be as free as possible from any except the one authority - The Joint Chiefs?

2. If you write a letter making such a suggestion and Secretary Hull quotes you in seeking General Marshall's approval are you put in the position of joining with the State Department to pressure your chief, however indirect, instead of first discussing the policy and its possible results with General Marshall direct?

RECOMMENDATION

I would rather see you take it up with Marshall and McNarney before writing Hull.

red.
GFB

Office of Strategic Services
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 29, 1942

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

TO: Colonel Donovan

FROM: David Bruce

There is attached a copy of a memorandum prepared by our British Empire Section. You will note Mr. Alling's suggestion in the third paragraph of this memorandum.

A.B.
 D. B.

Ned -
 If you agree
 will you prepare
 a letter for the
 State Dept.

145695

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Washington, D. C.

December 26, 1942

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Major Bruce

FROM: British Empire Section

SUBJECT: Suggestion by the State Department that Colonel Donovan suggest to Secretary of State Hull that he appoint an American counterpart to Lord Swinton in Africa.

The attached is a copy of a memorandum by Mr. Perry H. Jester of the State Department, who has recently been Consul General in Lagos, West Africa.

It was brought to my attention by Mr. Jester with whom Mr. Alling of the State Department asked me to discuss a matter concerning Africa.

Mr. Jester advised that a signed letter from the State Department to the U.S. Army is on Secretary of State Hull's desk, asking the approval of the Army for the proposal contained in the attached memorandum regarding the above suggestion. Mr. Jester's chief, Mr. Alling, concurs in the belief that if Colonel Donovan made the same sort of suggestion to the Secretary of State, it would hasten the sending of the above mentioned letter to the Army.

Incidentally it would be a splendid chance for the A.S.S. to suggest a man to fill the job proposed in the attached memorandum. You can readily see what an unusual opportunity for us this post offers, and the State Department has as yet no one in mind for the appointment.

A.D.H.

C O P Y

14069B

October 27, 1942

Appointment of a Special American Representative
To Work with Lord Swinton in Africa.

Lord Swinton, British Minister of State for West Africa, has requested the appointment of a commissioner or special representative with headquarters at Accra, with whom he could consult frequently on economic and political questions, shipping matters, strategic services, purchase of essential raw materials and other similar activities connected with the joint war effort. Lord Swinton concerns himself not only with the coordination of colonial government affairs in the British West African colonies, as regards the needs of the war effort and the fighting services, but with the formulation and operation of British policy pertaining to the whole of West Africa from Gambia in the north to Angola in the south. He is also intimately concerned in the formulation of policy and the operation of agreements made thereunder affecting the French and Belgian colonies in Central Africa. He is furthermore indirectly concerned with coordinating the development of colonial policy in British West African colonies with the same policy as regards British East African colonies working through the media of the West African Governors' Conference and the East African Governors' Conference.

The suggested appointment is a matter of vital importance and an unprecedented opportunity as regards American interests in the greater part of the Continent of Africa. The immediate objective is the coordinating for the war effort of American activity involving the numerous new agencies of this Government which are now placing their representatives in the African scene; namely, BEW, WPB, OCS, OWI, and the Intelligence Services of the Army and Navy. There is also the operation of such organizations as Pan American Airways and American Export Lines Airways and Transcontinental Western Airlines. There is furthermore the present operations of the Standard Vacuum Oil Company in extending its facilities for servicing our war machine in African territory with petroleum products and the long-range policy of this company as regards leases concerning land, installations and equipment. The need for coordination of all these related activities and the

correlation

140698

- 2 -

correlation of them with British activities is both great and urgent.

There is, however, a reason of even greater importance, for giving the most careful consideration to this appointment. The future of our economic relations with the greater part of the Continent of Africa is at stake today. The British statesmen at present working in that field, together with the colonial governments of British territory and associated British organizations which concern themselves with the war effort in the territory of other powers in Africa are thinking and planning now for projected and possible post-war developments in the economic and political ordering of the Continent. Decisions are being taken day by day and the groundwork for the structure of the future policies of the home governments is being mapped out. We should protect American economic interests in that Continent by having adequate representation on the spot to keep this Department advised of the trend of events, of the political and economic maneuvering of other powers, and of those steps which should be taken for the protection and furtherance of American interests.

It is suggested that we should send a special representative of the President to work with Lord Swinton and other British leaders in the war effort, but also to keep constantly in mind the long-range of our interests in all of that territory. I feel that this Government should appoint an outstanding, eminent American, who in personal capacity and background would be fully equal in stature to the type of British statesmen who are controlling British interests in Africa. He should be someone who is well versed in world economic affairs and particularly one who has had experience in negotiation and contact with British statesmen and officials. To send anyone less well qualified would only result in attaining for American interests the second-rate position which such second-rate representation would inevitably deserve.

Such an official, it is further suggested, should have a general commission to concern himself with the coordination of the war effort in the territory of the United Nations in Africa.

As

14069B

= 3 =

As pointed out by Mr. Willkie in his address last evening, the details of Imperialism and of the colonial system are definitely drawing to a close and we can look forward to the rise of nationalism equally in Africa as in other areas in the Near, Middle and Far East. Present conditions of control and government and the economic order-
ing of colonial possessions are undoubtedly due for a change, and in the era which is ahead we should be prepared to deal with such conditions of flux and change through the most adequate representation in the field that our Government can achieve.

W. A. R. [Signature]

For 5 conclusions
do not appear to
be supported by
the message &
the facts.

I understand
Mr. Fitzgerald has
arrived in DC & is
here in town today.

Director's Office

Our man [unclear]
(1930) [unclear] is here.
[unclear] [unclear]

SECRET

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794, as amended: the transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON

MID 350.09 Intelligence,
West Africa

By authority A. O. 111, 6-2

Date

October 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, O.S.S.:

Subject: Paraphrases.

1. In accordance with instructions from the J.P.W.C., I framed a message to General FitzGerald, C.G. American Forces in West Africa, of which the following is a paraphrase:

CM-OUT-2137, (10-7-42)

"Are you aware of and do you approve Donovan (OSS) project of starting new intelligence system in your area. Is the present Military Intelligence coverage adequate?"

Marshall"

2. A paraphrase of the response follows:

CM-IN-04038 (10-10-42)

"Have established liaison with local representative OSS named Henderson and therefore am familiar with the OSS Donovan project here. The present Military Intelligence coverage will be adequate and entirely satisfactory when those additional personnel requested get here. Cannot see any useful work being accomplished by Meobersowi in African fields and recommend that that work be discontinued.

FitzGerald"

3. Because nobody by the name of Meobersowi could be turned up, General Strong directed another telegram be sent. Paraphrase follows:

CM-OUT-03658 (10-11-42)

"That additional personnel requested for intelligence coverage are being gathered and will be sent as soon as possible. Neverowski is British SOE and not a member of Donovan organization. If you want him removed we will go about it, even though it may cause some embarrassment. Do you recommend that he be the only ~~one~~ to be suppressed or should all of OSS activity be discontinued.

Marshall"

**SECRET**

SECRET

From this it is inferred that the similarity (?) of Neverowski and Nachersowi caused confusion.

4. The answer to the last message is paraphrased as follows:

CM-IN-06006 (10/12/48)

"Have no objection to Neverowski and believe OSS will be useful. Do not recommend the discontinuance of all OSS. Do recommend the stopping of the work of the OWI in West Africa as it makes the security problem more difficult and has no military value

FitzGerald".

5. From this succession of messages it is believed that:

- a. O.W.I. is "persona non grata" in that area.
- b. O.S.S. is O.K., as is.
- c. No additional intelligence coverage is needed.
- d. British SOE is not getting in the way though not particularly desired.

6. The above were my recommendations to General Strong, which he approved.

Charles C. Blakeney
 Charles C. Blakeney,
 Lt. Colonel, G.S.C.
 Chief, Psychological Warfare Branch.

SECRET

URGENT
Originals went to
Col. Donovan the morning
meeting at 2:30 PM. TDS
(852)

Copy 4 of 6
SECRET

October 18, 1944

O.S.S. OPERATING IN BRITISH WEST AFRICA

In May 1944 two men were sent to Lagos, Nigeria, by the Coordinator of Information for the purpose of establishing a close liaison with the civilian British Intelligence organizations there. It was ascertained that these organizations were successfully obtaining a great mass of detailed information - military, political, economical - from Vichy French West Africa, chiefly by the use of a large number of native agents operating in the French colonies. While the general surveys published by British Intelligence were being received in Washington, the detailed information and much current information was not being forwarded here.

French West Africa is an area of tremendous size, regarding which there is a very inadequate description for military purposes. We found that the interested desks in O-2 were most desirous of getting complete, highly detailed information on every section of every colony in the Vichy French group, and furthermore, that this information be kept current.

The only area in scope has been the U. S. Consulate at Dakar. The difficulties of a small Consulate reporting in detail on an area about half the size of the United States is obvious. Furthermore, parts of the hinterland of French West Africa are 1,000 miles distant from Dakar. Therefore, it was decided that we should (1) endeavor to establish our own sources in various parts of French West

SECRET

October 14, 1944

2. THE INTELLIGENCE IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA

In May 1944 the G-2 was sent to Lagos, Nigeria, by the G-2 to obtain information for the purpose of establishing a close liaison with the civilian British intelligence organizations there. It was ascertained that these organizations were successfully obtaining a great mass of detailed information - military, political, economical - from French West Africa, chiefly by the use of a large number of active agents operating in the French colonies. While the general surveys published by British intelligence were being received in Washington, the detailed information and much current information was not being forwarded here.

French West Africa is an area of tremendous size, regarding which there is a very inadequate description for military purposes. As a result, the intelligence value is not being realized of getting complete, highly detailed information on every section of every colony in French West Africa, and furthermore, that this information be kept accurate.

The only direct liaison agency has been the U. S. Consulate in Lagos. The directorship of a small consulate reporting in detail on an area about half the size of the United States is obvious. Furthermore, many of the inhabitants of French West Africa are 1,000 miles distant from Lagos. Therefore, it was decided that we should (1) establish an intelligence post in various parts of French West

...involvement in British West Africa. (1) obtain from British Intelligence in the British colonies the results of their work in the French colonies.

One of the two men we sent to Nigeria was stationed in Kano, near the border of the French Niger colony; the other was stationed near the border of French Dahomey. The effect was most gratifying. We began receiving the most detailed sort of information on the French area contiguous to Nigeria. On the French areas contiguous to the other three British colonies, (Gambia, Sierra Leone and Gold Coast), we were receiving no reports. A representative whom we had sent to West Africa to supervise our activities in the area from Gambia to Angola recommended stationing men for liaison purposes in each one of the four British colonies, this as being the only means of obtaining the full benefit of the British Intelligence work on the areas contiguous to these colonies.

Since the material coming in to us from Nigeria - (a sizeable quantity is received almost every week by airpost) - has been enthusiastically praised by the Western European Section of G-2, there seemed to be no question as to the wisdom of promptly expanding to the other three colonies.

The staff required is approximately:

In Nigeria	2 men
In Gold Coast	2 men
In Sierra Leone	2 men
In Gambia	1 man
For clerical work and communications	1 man
Total	8 men

We have now three men already in the field on this undertaking, and we have now recruited training and are awaiting transportation. It

SECRET
 Page 1.

C.S.S. Intelligence in British West Africa

It is probable that the four additional men needed to complete the original mission be dispatched with the least possible delay.

All of our men on this undertaking are in a civilian status. It is, in fact, necessary that they wear civilian clothes because they are very closely identified with the British Secret Intelligence organization which, in West Africa, is civilian. However, the civilian nature of the British organization is only superficial since most of its members are either Army officers seconded to this special duty, or are Reserve officers of the West African Frontier Force. C.S.S. representatives working in close association with these men will be definitely more effective if they can be made commissioned officers of the U. S. Army Reserve, thus placing them on a better footing with their British colleagues. It was for this reason that C.S.S. requested that Mr. John W. Williams be commissioned as Major, AUS, Reserve.

The question may arise as to why officers of our own M.I.6. cannot accomplish just what C.S.S. is endeavoring to accomplish in this undertaking. The answer lies in the fact that British Military Intelligence are doing one type of work in West Africa, and British Secret Intelligence are doing quite another. Our liaison men, whose training is largely in the methods used by British Secret Intelligence service, can consequently establish a more intimate contact than could our M.I.6. officers who, in West Africa, are in uniform and who have other military intelligence duties to perform.

Within the last few days a Syrian merchant of American nationality, who has long resided in French West Africa, came into Liberia to renew his passport, after which he will go back into French West Africa. It

order, including the British and French, and also the United States, including the British, French, and possible assistance of this person, through his own contacts, working through a third party, with a preliminary agreement with the British authorities. In a recent report, it is stated that the instructions which will result in his sending to our own intelligence sources from the Vichy colonies. Since this person served a number of years in the U. S. Army, he is by no means ill-equipped to receive reliable order information. Because of his wide contact with other persons even closer to the Ivory Coast, a very considerable number of informants are available to him. To make an arrangement such as this and to service it thereafter requires the kind of organization we are establishing. This case is cited simply to show how our organization in West Africa is not in duplication of the work of M.I.6.

Our conception of the purpose of this undertaking in West Africa is that it will, firstly, be a source of current information for the Theatre Commander, and secondly, be a medium for acquiring the sensitive knowledge of detailed information necessary for G-2 and G-3, in order to complete their surveys in this area. The political, economic, geographic, and social sections of these surveys are prepared by the Research and Analysis Branch of G-2, for G-2, and much of the material collected by our field men is for this purpose. Indeed, the material we collect pertaining to the British colonies is almost exclusively for this purpose. However, the information on the area concerning the British colonies, and which is potential enemy territory, is useful to the Theatre Commander, to the War and Navy Departments in Washington, and to our own Research and Analysis Branch.

SECRET**O.S.S. Undertaking in French West Africa**

About ten months ago the U.S. Theatre Commander at Paris was contacted by our supervisor in West Africa for the purpose of describing to him our little organization in his Theatre, and placing it at his disposal for such services as he might wish to have it perform. The Theatre Commander expressed his approval of the personnel and the work they are doing.

In view of the strategic importance of all parts of West and Central Africa; in view of the fact that relatively little is known in Washington of that enormous area about which, because it has so many peculiarities, it is necessary to know a great deal in order to make any thorough military study, it would seem most advisable that O.S.S. continue and amplify the work which it has begun in that area. The writer does not know of a single officer in either G-2 or in O.S.S. who has ever travelled in any part of French West Africa. It is, perhaps, to some extent because of that unavoidable lack of geographic experts on that area that every scrap of information is welcomed by G-2 and O.S.S. with the comment that it is useful and, in many cases, quite valuable.

City 485
SECRET

October 26, 1942

S.I.E. DISSENTING IN LIBERIA

The Republic of Liberia is a country in which German trading firms had gained a very predominant place. At the start of this year this office began receiving reports containing evidence of various subversive activities on the part of German nationals and other people friendly to them in Liberia. There was evidence of signaling to submarines, evidence of fresh food and water being taken off shore at night, evidence of intelligence reports being smuggled out of the country, evidence of the existence of at least one illegal radio transmitter, and other subversive activities. Due to the very weak nature of the Liberian Government, nothing whatsoever was being done by that Government to meet this situation.

This office came to the conclusion that because of the rapidly increasing strategic importance of Liberia, it was essential that these enemy subversive activities be investigated by undercover agents.

After consultation with Colonel Harry McBride, the State Department's advisor on Liberia, who had just returned from that area, a program was developed (in April of 1942) and discussed with Commander Hinchey, USN, and with Colonel Compton, British.

3.3.1. German Agents in Liberia

Major Gordon of 2nd. It wishes specifically to emphasize that this is not the work of our undercover agents working in collaboration with the Army of Germany. We were definitely informed that such was not the case and that our understanding, if correct, would render a valuable strategic service.

The officer who had been designated to command a detachment of American troops to be sent to Liberia was informed of our understanding by Colonel Dargatzis and expressed a very favorable interest. At his request he was furnished the names of the field agents so that he might have contact with them, if and when desired.

Most of the German nationals were expelled from Liberia some weeks ago, and now the German Consul and his staff are about to be expelled. There is, however, excellent ground for assuming that the departure of these Germans will not mean the end of their subversive activities. A considerable number of native Liberians and a few white people of non-German nationality (Swiss, Dutch, etc.) have been more than friendly with the Germans, and undoubtedly some of these people in the pay of the Germans will carry on the subversive activities. Several of the expelled German nationals have taken up residence in the Vichy-French Ivory Coast just across the Liberian border, from which point clandestine communications can be maintained.

The number of agents which we have in Liberia is very small, but they have all been very carefully selected and possess exactly the qualifications necessary to accomplish their task under the peculiar circumstances which obtain in Liberia. These are the

SECRET

C-2. Undertaking in Liberia

Undercover agents strategically placed as follows:

1. At Robertsport, near Fisherman Lake. A missionary doctor who has had several years previous experience in Liberia and whose work bring him in contact with a large number of natives in that corner of Liberia. He also served Pan American Airways. As a result of one of his reports, it was discovered that a steward at the Pan American Hotel named Landotti has been acting in a very suspicious manner, and further investigation brought out facts which cast a very grave doubt as to his loyalty. Although the case is incomplete, the State Department has just decided to revoke his passport.

2. An American school teacher travels all along the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone visiting mission schools. This person has had many years experience in Liberia, speaks the native languages fluently, and is intimate with the village native chiefs. This agent is ideally placed to uncover native runners who might be carrying messages from Sierra Leone into Liberia.

3. At a point on the border between Liberia and Vichy-French Guinea there is located one of our agents working in a medical clinic to which come natives from all of that border country. This agent has lived for a number of years at that place, speaks the dialects fluently, and has intimate contacts with hundreds of native chieftains and others.

4. In the Cape Palmas area we have an agent who has spent years in that section as a labor recruiter and construction engineer for the Firestone Plantations. He is ideally situated to

1. The following is in Liberia

which are being maintained across the river from Monrovia, as well as to keep the situation moving along the western side of Liberia.

2. The key man in our organization is the head of an important educational institution near Monrovia. He has been working like twenty-five years in Liberia and is undoubtedly the American who possesses the greatest knowledge of that country. He acts in an advisory capacity for all the educational institutions and agencies throughout Liberia which gives him wide freedom of movement. He is better liked and has more influence among all classes of people in Liberia than any other white man, and has the distinction of being the only white person who has ever asked to take an official post in the Liberian Government. He recently uncovered the fact that an obscure native Liberian preacher working among the Kpelle tribe is in the pay of the Germans.

3. Of these five agents are white American citizens, and with the exception of one have been thoroughly trained at our school.

4. The other reason for suspecting the existence of an enemy wireless transmitter is the fact that certain radio parts and only one transmitter were found in the home of a German agent who has also been captured. From time to time submarine activity off the Liberian shore causes intense concern and there is a serious question as to whether or not the Germans have received intelligence transmitted by a short distance, long-range transmitter. If such a transmitter does exist, we have hopes that our field agents may have access to the kind of reliable wireless messages to the United States that will be of great help in our efforts to maintain the situation.

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Page 1**G-2.E. Undertaking in Liberia**

10. However, we have felt that the use of radio direction finding equipment and radio intercept technicians should be brought to bear on this problem. After ascertaining that nothing of this kind was already being done in Liberia, we sent a small amount of radio equipment and two specially trained radio technicians to Liberia for this purpose. Three others, it is hoped, will follow very shortly.

These radiomen are working as employees of Pan American Airways. It is necessary that there be provided an intelligence officer familiar with our entire intelligence undertaking in Liberia, who can serve as a contact with our radio technicians and coordinate their efforts with the remainder of the organization. The ideal status for this duty is that of an officer of the Air Transport Command stationed at Roberts Field or at Fisherman Lake.

It was for this purpose that we requested that Mr. Silveira, who has been extensively trained for this particular job, be commissioned and assigned to duty with the Office of Strategic Services.

In connection with the entire Liberian problem it should be noted that there is not at present a single G-2 officer in Liberia.

It is prohibited to disseminate information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C., or an amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

WID 380.09 Intelligence,
West Africa

SECRET

By authority A. C. of S., 6-2

Date 10/24/42 (JCH)

October 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, O.S.S.:

Subject: Paraphrase.

1. In accordance with instructions from the J.P.S.C., I framed a message to General Fitzgerald, C.G. American Forces in West Africa, of which the following is a paraphrase:

CM-OUT-2127, (10-7-42)

"Are you aware of and do you approve Donovan (OSS) project of starting new intelligence system in your area. Is the present Military Intelligence coverage adequate?"

Marshall"

2. A paraphrase of the response follows:

CM-IN-04038 (10-10-42)

"Have established liaison with local representative OSS named Henderson and therefore am familiar with the OSS Donovan project here. The present Military Intelligence coverage will be adequate and entirely satisfactory when these additional personnel requested get here. Cannot see any useful work being accomplished by Macbersewi in African fields and recommend that that work be discontinued.

FitzGerald"

3. Because nobody by the name of Macbersewi could be turned up, General Strong directed another telegram be sent. Paraphrase follows:

CM-OUT-03668 (10-12-42)

"That additional personnel requested for intelligence coverage are being gathered and will be sent as soon as possible. Keverowski is British SOE and not a member of Donovan organization. If you want him removed we will go ahead with it, even though it may cause some embarrassment. Do you recommend that he be the only person left to be suppressed or should all of OSS activity be discontinued.

Marshall"

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From this it is inferred that the similarity (1) of Noveroni and Richardson caused confusion.

c. The answer to the last message is paraphrased as follows:

04-12-05004 (10/12/68)

"Have no objection to Noveroni and believe GSI will be useful. Do not recommend the discontinuance of all GSI. Do recommend the stopping of the work of the GSI in West Africa as it makes the security problem more difficult and has no military value

Richardson".

d. From this succession of messages it is believed that:

1. O.N.I. is "persona non grata" in that area.

2. G.C.B. is O.N.I., as is.

3. No additional intelligence coverage is needed.

4. British GSI is not getting in the way though not particularly desired.

5. The above were my recommendations to General Strong, which he approved.

Charles C. Haddeney,
Lt. Colonel, G.S.I.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Branch.

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October 18, 1942

G.S.S. UNDERTAKING IN BRITISH WEST AFRICA

In May 1942 two men were sent to Lagos, Nigeria, by the Coordinator of Information for the purpose of establishing a close liaison with the civilian British Intelligence organizations there. It was ascertained that those organizations were successfully obtaining a great mass of detailed information - military, political, economical - from Vichy French West Africa, chiefly by the use of a large number of native agents operating in the French colonies. While the general surveys published by British Intelligence were being received in Washington, the detailed information and much current information was not being forwarded here.

French West Africa is an area of tremendous size, regarding which there is a very inadequate description for military purposes. We found that the interested desks in G-2 were most desirous of getting complete, highly detailed information on every section of every colony in the Vichy French group, and furthermore, that this information be kept current.

The only direct American source has been the U. S. Consulate at Dakar. The difficulties of a small Consulate reporting in detail on an area about half the size of the United States is obvious. Furthermore, parts of the hinterland of French West Africa are 1,000 miles distant from Dakar. Therefore, it was decided that we should (1) endeavor to establish our own sources in various parts of French West

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 Page 1.

G.S.E. Undertaking in British West Africa

Africa, and (2) obtain from British Intelligence in the British colonies the results of their work in the French colonies.

One of the two men we sent to Nigeria was stationed in Kano, near the border of the French Niger colony; the other was stationed near the border of French Senegal. The effect was most gratifying. We began receiving the most detailed sort of information on the French area contiguous to Nigeria. On the French areas contiguous to the other three British colonies, (Gambia, Sierra Leone and Gold Coast), we were receiving no reports. A representative whom we had sent to West Africa to supervise our activities in the area from Gambia to Angola recommended stationing men for liaison purposes in each one of the four British colonies, this as being the only means of obtaining the full benefit of the British Intelligence work on the areas contiguous to those colonies.

Since the material coming in to us from Nigeria - (a sizeable quantity is received almost every week by airpouch) - has been enthusiastically praised by the Western European Section of G-2, there seemed to be no question as to the wisdom of promptly expanding to the other three colonies.

The staff required is approximately:

In Nigeria	2 men
In Gold Coast	2 men
In Sierra Leone	2 men
In Gambia	1 man
For clerical work and communications	<u>1</u> man
Total	8 men

We now have three men already in the field on this undertaking, and two others have completed training and are awaiting transportation. It

SECRET**O.S.S. Undertaking in British West Africa**

It is advisable that the four additional men needed to complete the organization be dispatched with the least possible delay.

All of our men on this undertaking are in a civilian status. It is, in fact, necessary that they wear civilian clothes because they are very closely identified with the British Secret Intelligence organization which, in West Africa, is civilian. However, the civilian nature of the British organization is only superficial since most of its members are either Army officers seconded to this special duty, or are reserve officers of the West African Frontier Force. O.S.S. representatives working in close association with these men will be definitely more effective if they can be made commissioned officers of the U. S. Army Reserve, thus placing them on a better footing with their British colleagues. It was for this reason that O.S.S. requested that Mr. John W. Williams be commissioned as Major, AUS, Reserve.

The question may arise as to why officers of our own M.I.8. cannot accomplish just what O.S.S. is endeavoring to accomplish in this undertaking. The answer lies in the fact that British Military Intelligence are doing one type of work in West Africa, and British Secret Intelligence are doing quite another. Our liaison men, whose training is largely in the methods used by British Secret Intelligence service, can consequently establish a more intimate contact than could our M.I.8. officers who, in West Africa, are in uniform and who have other military intelligence duties to perform.

Within the last few days a Syrian merchant of American nationality, but a long resident in French West Africa, came into Liberia to renew his passport, after which he will go back into French West Africa. He

SECRET**C.S.S. Undertaking in British West Africa**

were able to obtain information confirming the loyalty, reliability, and possible usefulness of this person, whereupon one of our representatives, working through a third party, made a satisfactory arrangement with this Syrian merchant. As a result we now may, if desired, send him instructions which will result in his sending to our men intelligence reports from the Vichy colonies. Since this Syrian served a number of years in the U. S. Army, he is by no means ill-equipped to report Battle Order information. Because of his wide contact with other Syrians from Dakar to the Ivory Coast, a very considerable number of informants are available to him. To make an arrangement such as this and to service it thereafter requires the kind of organization we are establishing. This case is cited simply to show how our organization in West Africa is not in duplication of the work of M.I.8.

Our conception of the purpose of this undertaking in West Africa is that it shall, firstly, be a service of current information for the Theatre Commander, and secondly, be a medium for acquiring the massive amount of detailed information necessary for G-2 and O.N.I. in order to complete their surveys on this area. The political, economic, geographic, and social sections of these surveys are prepared by the Research and Analysis branch of C.S.S. for G-2, and much of the material collected by our field men is for this purpose. Indeed, the material we collect pertaining to the British colonies is almost exclusively for this purpose. However, the information on the area surrounding the British colonies, and which is potential enemy territory, is useful to the Theatre Commander, to the War and Navy Departments in Washington, and to our own Research and Analysis branch.

SECRET**O.S.S. Undertaking in British West Africa**

Page 5.

About two months ago the U.S. Theatre Commander at Accra was contacted by our supervisor in West Africa for the purpose of describing to him our little organization in his Theatre, and placing it at his disposal for such services as he might wish to have it perform. The Theatre Commander expressed his approval of the personnel and the work they are doing.

In view of the strategic importance of all parts of West and Central Africa; in view of the fact that relatively little is known in Washington of that enormous area about which, because it has so many peculiarities, it is necessary to know a great deal in order to make any thorough military study, it would seem most advisable that O.S.S. continue and amplify the work which it has begun in that area. The writer does not know of a single officer in either G-2 or in O.N.I. who has ever travelled in any part of French West Africa. It is, perhaps, to some extent because of that unavoidable lack of geographic experts on that area that every scrap of information is welcomed by G-2 and O.N.I. with the comment that it is useful and, in many cases, quite valuable.

SECRET

October 10, 1942

O.I.L.B. UNDERTAKING IN LIBERIA

The Republic of Liberia is a country in which German trading firms had gained a very predominant place. At the start of this year this office began receiving reports containing evidence of various subversive activities on the part of German nationals and other people friendly to them in Liberia. There was evidence of signalling to submarines, evidence of fresh food and water being taken off shore at night, evidence of intelligence reports being smuggled out of the country, evidence of the existence of at least one illegal radio transmitter, and other subversive activities. Due to the very weak nature of the Liberian Government, nothing whatsoever was being done by that Government to meet this situation.

This office came to the conclusion that because of the rapidly increasing strategic importance of Liberia, it was essential that these enemy subversive activities be investigated by undercover agents.

After consultation with Colonel Harry McBride, the State Department's adviser on Liberia, who had just returned from that area, a program was developed (in April of 1942) and discussed with Commander Biheldorff, ONI, and with Colonel Compton, British

SECRET**Outline: Undertaking in Liberia**

Empire Section of 4-2. We wished specifically to ascertain whether or not the work of our undercover agents would be duplicating anything being undertaken by the Army or Navy. We were verbally informed that such was not the case and that our undertaking, if successful, would render a valuable strategic service.

The officer who had been designated to command a detachment of American troops to be sent to Liberia was informed of our undertaking by Colonel Compton and expressed a very favorable interest. At his request he was furnished the names of the field agents so that he might have contact with them, if and when desired.

Most of the German nationals were expelled from Liberia some weeks ago, and now the German Consul and his staff are about to be expelled. There is, however, excellent grounds for assuming that the departure of these Germans will not mean the end of their subversive activities. A considerable number of native Liberians and a few white people of non-German nationality (Swiss, Danes, etc.) have been more than friendly with the Germans, and undoubtedly some of these people in the pay of the Germans will carry on the subversive activities. Several of the expelled German nationals have taken up residence in the Vichy-French Ivory Coast just over the Liberian border, from which point clandestine communications can be continued.

The number of agents which we have in Liberia is very small, but they have all been very carefully selected and possess exactly the qualifications necessary to accomplish this task under the peculiar circumstances which exist in Liberia. There are five

SECRET
Page 1.**C.S.S. Undertaking in Liberia**

undercover agents strategically placed as follows:

1. At Robertsport, near Fisherman Lake. A missionary doctor who has had several years previous experience in Liberia and whose work bring him in contact with a large number of natives in that corner of Liberia. He also serves Pan American Airways. As a result of one of his reports, it was discovered that a steward at the Pan American Hotel named Sandotti has been acting in a very suspicious manner, and further investigation brought out facts which cast a very grave doubt as to his loyalty. Although the case is incomplete, the State Department has just decided to revoke his passport.

2. An American school teacher travels all along the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone visiting mission schools. This person has had many years experience in Liberia, speaks the native languages fluently, and is intimate with the village native chieftains. This agent is ideally placed to uncover native runners who might be carrying messages from Sierra Leone into Liberia.

3. At a point on the border between Liberia and Vichy-French Guinea there is located one of our agents working in a medical clinic to which come natives from all of that border country. This agent has lived for a number of years at that place, speaks the dialects fluently, and has intimate contacts with hundreds of native chieftains and others.

4. In the Cape Palmas area we have an agent who has spent years in that section as a labor recruiter and construction engineer for the Firestone Plantations. He is ideally situated to

SECRET**2.2.2. Undertaking in Liberia**

conduct any enemy trafficking across the Ivory Coast border, as well as to look for subversive activity along the southeast shore of Liberia.

3. The key man in our organization is the head of an important educational institution near Monrovia. He has spent something like twenty-five years in Liberia and is undoubtedly the American who possesses the greatest knowledge of that country. He acts in an advisory capacity for all the educational institutions and missions throughout Liberia which gives him wide freedom of movement. He is better liked and has more influence among all classes of people in Liberia than any other white man, and has the distinction of being the only white person who has ever asked to take an official post in the Liberian Government. He recently uncovered the fact that an obscure native Liberian preacher working among the Kru tribe is in the pay of the Germans.

All of these five agents are white American citizens, and with the exception of one have been thoroughly trained at our school.

Among other reasons for suspecting the existence of an enemy wireless transmitter is the fact that certain radio parts used only on transmitters were found in the home of a German agent who has since been expelled. From time to time submarine activity off the Liberian shore becomes intense and there is a serious question as to whether or not the submarines have received intelligence transmitted by a short distance, low-power transmitter. If such a transmitter does exist, we have hopes that our field agents may come across the trail of natives carrying messages to the transmitting station, and in that way we might be successful in locating

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3.3.2. Undertaking in Liberia

It. However, we have felt that the use of radio direction finding equipment and radio intercept technicians should be brought to bear on this problem. After ascertaining that nothing of this kind was already being done in Liberia, we sent a small amount of radio equipment and two specially trained radio technicians to Liberia for this purpose. Three others, it is hoped, will follow very shortly.

These radiomen are working as employees of Pan American Airways. It is necessary that there be provided an intelligence officer familiar with our entire intelligence undertaking in Liberia, who can serve as a contact with our radio technicians and coordinate their efforts with the remainder of the organization. The ideal status for this duty is that of an officer of the Air Transport Command stationed at Roberts Field or at Fisherman Lake.

It was for this purpose that we requested that Mr. Silveira, who has been extensively trained for this particular job, be commissioned and assigned to duty with the Office of Strategic Services.

In connection with the entire Liberian problem it should be noted that there is not at present a single G-2 officer in Liberia.

No. 2

PROCLAMATION

ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

Headquarters of Theater of Operations

1942

TO THE PEOPLE OF: FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

The Army of the United States is in control of the territory of FRENCH NORTH AFRICA and is advancing farther into French North African territory. The purpose of this control is to prevent our common enemies from invading your country, and is an act necessary to the winning of the war by the United States and its allies. It is the policy of the Army of the United States, not to make war on you, the civilian population of your territory; but, on the contrary, to maintain tranquillity and order in that territory. As Commanding General of the Theater of Operations, I have therefore established military control in French North Africa. The establishment and operation of military control, by preserving order, will benefit you. It is to your interest, as well as your duty, to cooperate with and obey it.

During such control, the political ties which have hitherto bound you to the Government of Vichy, or any agency thereof, and your obligations of obedience to, and support of it, are suspended. The authority of the Army of the United States and of the military control established by it, is supreme. You must therefore obey promptly and fully, in letter and in spirit, such orders and ordinances as I, my successors as Commanding General of the Theater of Operations, and subordinate military authorities may issue from time to time. In particular, you must obey the directions of military policemen and personnel on civil affairs duty, who wear a purple arm band bearing the letters "CA". You must refrain from any act or word of hostility or disrespect to the controlling forces.

Your laws and regulations in force at the time of our taking control will remain in force, except insofar as they conflict with a state of war, or with the rights and safety of the controlling forces, or as they may be changed by me or my successors. The executive and judicial officers

of your government and of its regions, counties and cities, towns and villages, will continue the performance of their duties as usual, subject to supervision and direction by personnel under command of the Army of the United States on civil affairs duty. The officers and employees of the railroads, steamboat lines, bus and truck lines, street railways, electric light and power plants and transmission lines, post offices, telephones, telegraphs, cables, radio stations, waterworks, gas works, and other public utilities within the controlled territory, must continue in the performance of their duties.

You who obey the directions given in this Proclamation and in other orders and ordinances, have nothing to fear from the Army of the United States, and you will be protected by them in your persons, property, family rights, religion, and in the exercise of your peaceful occupations. You who fail to render such obedience or who commit crimes or offenses will be severely punished.

You will continue your usual occupations; your churches, mosques, temples, and schools will remain open.

Ordinances will be issued setting forth in detail what is required of you, and what it is forbidden for you to do.

Your religious rights and institutions will be respected.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding